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I.

INTRODUCTION

All the issues raised in American Bank's Opening Brief have been fully briefed and
argued.

This brief is limited to the issues raised in the cross-appeal of Wadsworth Golf

Construction Company ofthe Southwest ("Wadsworth").
In American Bank's Cross-Respondent's Brief American Bank argues: "Wadsworth
should not be granted a windfall of $2,425,483.00 simply because American Bank posted the
Lien Release Bond." (Brief, p. 2). What this argument omits is any mention of the windfall that
American Bank would receive ifthis Court were to adopt positions taken by American Bank.
American Bank knew that it was lending money to BRN Development ("BRN") for the
purposes of the construction of the golf course and improvements for what was commonly
referred to as the Black Rock North Development. Recitals "A" and "B" of the Revolving
Credit Agreement entered into between American Bank as lender and BRN as borrower
(Exhibit 38, p. 1) provided:
A. Borrower owns certain real property located in Kootenai County,
Idaho commonly referred to as the "Black Rock North"
development. Borrower is developing the real property by, among
other things, the construction of a golf course and equestrian
facility and related improvements and the subdivision of the
property for the sale of residential parcels.
B. Borrower has requested that Lender make available to Borrower an
extension of credit and to advance from time to time funds for the
construction of improvements and the development of the real
property in the ordinary course of Borrower's business.
The entire development consisted of approximately one thousand acres.

The golf course

traverses throughout the project and consist of approximately two hundred acres. R. Vol. 13, p.
3211.
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Wadsworth substantially completed construction of the golf course on October 20,2008,
with final completion occurring on November 21,2008. R. Vol. 13, p. 3217. The District Court
found that the golf course benefits the entire one thousand acre project. R. Vol. 13, p. 3232.
On May 19, 2011, American Bank purchased the entire one thousand acre parcel at the
foreclosure sale for a credit bid of$18,682,767.78. R. VoU3, p. 3211.
Between American Bank and Wadsworth one of the two entities will suffer what will
appear to them to be an approximate 2.4 million dollar loss. If the loss is to be suffered by
Wadsworth, American Bank will have received the property with a fully constructed high end
Tom Weiskopf designed golf course without having the general contractor, being Wadsworth,
paid in full. If the decision of the District Court is affinned by this Court Wadsworth will merely
be receiving payment for its work, labor, and materials. American Bank desired to have the
Wadsworth lien removed so that it could deal with its interest in the property free of the lien. It
did so and apparently sold a substantial interest in the project to Fidelity National Timber
Resources. American Bank got what it wanted and if it escapes from paying Wadsworth the
balance owing under the construction contract, American Bank will have received a windfall. If
Wadsworth prevails in this appeal, it will not receive a windfall but merely receive payment for
the services, labor, and material that it provided which now is to the benefit of American Bank.
II.

ARGUMENT

1. The District Court Erred in Finding That Wadsworth Waived its Lien Rights for
Retainage.

The final contract between Wadsworth and BRN is set forth as American Bank Exhibit 1
and Wadsworth Exhibit D. The two exhibits differ in that the Wadsworth Exhibit has attached to
it more exhibits and addendums than the American Bank exhibit. The American Bank exhibit
consist of thirty-five (36 pages if the Capps January 27, 2007 letter is included) and the
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Wadsworth exhibit consist of one hundred eight pages, which includes a copy of the Capps
letter.

Excluding the Capps letter the first thirty-five pages of the Wadsworth exhibit are

identical to the first thirty-five pages ofthe American Bank exhibit.
The District Court found that under the contract Wadsworth was obligated to use the
BRN prepared lien release fonn. R. Vol. 13, p. 3241. That, however, is not what the contract
provided. Page four of the general conditions, (Exhibit 1, p. 5; Exhibit D, p. 4) stated:
Subcontractor shall submit original payment applications to Owner by
the 25 th of the month (faxed payment applications are not acceptable).
Should the 25 th fallon a weekend, all payments applications shall be
submitted on the Friday before. Payments shall be deposited, postage
prepaid, return receipt requested, in the regular United States Mail. As
a prerequisite for any payment, Subcontractor shall provide, in a
form satisfactory to Owner, partial lien releases, claim waivers,
and affidavits of payment from Subcontractor, and its
subcontractors and suppliers of any tier, for the billed portion of
Subcontractor's work. (Emphasis added).
In the final contract BRN is referred to as the owner and Wadsworth is referred to as the
subcontractor.
The contract did have various exhibits attached to it and incorporated by reference.
(Exhibit 1, p. 3; Exhibit D, p. 2). One of the exhibits, attached as Exhibit B was the BRN Lien
Release Fonn, identified in the contract as a "interim lien/claim waiver" and on the document
itself entitled "Conditional Lien Waiver, Release and Subordination." (Exhibit 1, p. 22; Exhibit
D, p. 21).

Wadsworth submits that the attaching of the BRN prepared lien release fonn to the
contract did not change the contractual provision that Wadsworth was to submit to BRN, in a
fonn satisfactory to BRN, partial lien releases, claim waivers, and affidavits of payment. The
exhibit to the contract is merely an example of a fonn acceptable to BRN.
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As set forth in Wadsworth's initial brief, Wadsworth would generally submit its own
prepared lien release form developed pursuant to Arizona Revised Statute Section 33-10008.
The only times that a BRN prepared lien release form was used was when the Wadsworth
payment application either did not include the Wadsworth prepared lien release form with the
application, when BRN was proposing to pay an amount different than the amount set forth in
the Wadsworth lien release form, or when on that one occasion, the Wadsworth prepared lien
release form mistakenly identified the name ofthe project. Tr., pp. 288-289.
BRN made full payment of eleven Wadsworth payment applications accompanied by a
Wadsworth prepared lien release form, and made a partial payment on a twelfth application
accompanied by the Wadsworth prepared lien release form. The District Court remarked that it
was obvious that BRN accepted the Wadsworth prepared lien release form. Tr. p. 341. BRN
never voiced any objection to Wadsworth's use of its lien release form. Tr. p. 239.
Mr. Harrell, the President of Wadsworth, testified that it was his understanding that the

Wadsworth prepared lien release form did not waive or release any rights to retainage or rights to
lien for retainage. Tr. p.239. On those limited occasions when Mr. Harrell executed a BRN
prepared lien release form he did not understand that there was any difference between the two
forms. Tr. pp. 288-289; 313-314; 237-239; 242-243. When signing the BRN prepared lien
release form, Mr. Harrell understood the form to have the same legal effect as the Wadsworth
prepared form, and would not effect any of the rights pertaining to retainage. Tr. pp. 237-239,
242-243.
Mr. Kyle Capps, the project manager for BRN, testified that he did not know the true
meaning or purpose of the BRN prepared lien release form. Tr. p. 344. As Mr. Capps did not
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know the meaning of the BRN prepared lien release form, he presumably would not know the
difference between the two forms.
Prior to the preparation of a trial transcript, the District Court, in its memorandum
decision, wrote: "Mr. Capps testified that Wadsworth was contractually obligated to execute and
deliver a Golden Release (BRN prepared lien release form) with each payment application that
Wadsworth submitted to BRN Development and that by doing so Wadsworth was bound by the
language contained in such Golden Release." Tr. p. 3239. Mr. Capps, however, only testified
that he merely expected that Wadsworth would utilize the BRN lien release form attached to the
contract but not necessarily that Wadsworth was contractually obligated to do so. Mr. Capps
testified as follows:

Q. And yesterday, Mr. Harrell testified that in
every application that Wadsworth would initially
submit to BRN, it was either accompanied by a
Wadsworth prepared lien release or on occasion
Wadsworth neglected to include their lien release.
Is that a fair statement based on your recollection"?

A. I'm not -- I don't recall specifically which lien
releases were attached. I know our contract had a
specific lien release that our group had produced
with the contract that we expected to be included.
But I think, as I testified in my deposition, I
typically reviewed the content and the billing
amounts for the contract items, and more often than
not, it was our accounting or control department
that would deal with the lien release and follow up
and make sure the lien release was included and
signed.

Q. But the initial application, wouldn't that go first
to your attention when it came in?
A. Yes. Yes.
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Q. And you would check to see if there was a lien
release attached to it?

A. Nonnally, yes. But after this last year, I found
that I wasn't thorough enough in making sure the
lien releases were attached to those. I counted on
our accounting department to deal with the lien
releases, because their policy was they would not
issue a check without a lien release.
Q. And is it your recollection that on occasion a
Black Rock North prepared lien release was
utilized.

A. Yes.
Q.
And, conversely, a number of times, the
Wadsworth lien release fonn was utilized. Do you
recall that?

A. Yes.
Q. And do you have any recollection as to why on
occasion the Black Rock lien release fonn was
used?

A. Again, that was -- the contract document would
have expected us to have each time, but I'm sure
that every time a lien release was not received with
application of payment, the accounting department
would send one out requiring it to be signed before
payment was issued.
Q. And we also had some testimony that there were
some times when Black Rock North proposed or
BRN Development proposed to pay an amount less
than the application. One example was there's an
application for about roughly a million two and
BRN Development proposed to pay only a million
of that. Do you recall that occasion?
A. I recall that, yeah.
Q. And we've had testimony that Wadsworth had
submitted a lien release in the original application
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amount, and when BRN decided to pay a lesser
amount, it generated its lien release to coincide with
the amount of the payment. Do you recall that?
A. I don't know about that. I wasn't involved in the
preparation of that document.
Q. But it was your understanding that BRN needed
a lien release that matched the amount of the
payment?
A. Correct.

Q. Okay. Did anyone at BRN Development ever
tell you that they were concerned about the
difference between the one form of lien release and
the other?
A. Not that I recall, no. Tr. pp. 337-340.

In addition, Mr. Capps testified as follows:

Q.
And then the testimony is that from
approximately October through January of 2006,
the final form contract was negotiated. Is that
consistent with your recollection?
A. Yes.
Q. And that there ultimately was a final contract
executed.
Is that also consistent with your
recollection?
A. Yes.

Q. Now, was it your understanding that the contract
required BRN -- I'm sorry -- required Wadsworth to
submit a lien waiver to obtain a progress payment?
A. Yes.
Q. And was it your understanding that the written
contract actually had a lien waiver that was
acceptable to BRN?
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A. Correct. Yes.
Q. Was that the lien waiver that you expected
Wadsworth to submit with its payment
applications?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you rely upon Wadsworth to actually
do that, submit the payment application with that
particular lien release?
A. Yes. I expected that to be the one attached to -I think I previously testified I didn't specifically
review the lien release each time. I kind of counted
on my accounting department to make sure that got
covered.

Q. The actual contract that's been admitted into
evidence is 115 pages. Did you remember every
little detail of the contract as you were out there
working on this particular job?
A. No.

Q. Is that why you were relying upon Wadsworth
to comply with its contractual obligations?
A. Yes.
Q. And I think you testified that the actual lien
waiver that was acceptable to BRN and attached to
the contract was actually drafted by somebody else.
Correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Was it drafted by BRN's attorney?
A. I assume so, yeah. That's where the contract
came to me from. Tr. p. 352-353.
A.

Lack of Consideration.

In its memorandum decision, the District Court correctly held that an express waiver of a
materialman's lien must be supported by consideration in order to be effective and binding, citing
8

Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 539 P.2d 590 (1975.

R. Vol. 13, p. 3239. The doing of

something which one is already bound by contract to do is not a valid consideration. As stated
by the Court in Louk v. Patten, 58 Idaho 334, 73 P.2d 949, at 951 (1937): "A promise to do what
the promisor is already bound to do cannot be consideration, for if a person gets nothing in return
for his promise but that to which he is already legally entitled, the consideration is unreal." In its
memorandum decision, the District Court correctly Beebe Construction Corp v. Circle R Co., 10
Ohio App.2d 127, 226 N.E.2d 573, at 576 (1967) for the proposition that: "A waiver of a
mechanic's lien in consideration of payments made by an owner or contractor, which he is
legally bound to pay to the claimant, does not constitute valuable consideration so as to make the
lien waiver effective and binding." Likewise, in Sussel Co. v. First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of St. Paul, 304 Minn. 433, 232 N.W. 2d 88 (1975) the Court found that a lien
waiver given in connection with a contractually obligated progress payment merely constituted a
waiver of lien rights to the date of the payment but did not include a waiver of future lien rights
and lien priorities as no additional consideration beyond that which was owing was paid. Like
the case at hand, the Court in Sussel found valid consideration for a lien waiver to the extent of
the amount of the progress payment, but no consideration to the extent that the waiver purported
to waive additional lien rights.
While the District Court correctly articulated the law of consideration as it relates to lien
waivers, the Court rejected Wadsworth's argument that there was lack of consideration to
construe the BRN prepared lien waivers as waiving anything beyond any right to file a lien based
upon the amount of the payment, on the basis of the parties' stipulated findings of fact and on the
basis that the Court construed the BRN-Wadsworth contract as requiring the use of the BRN
prepared lien waiver form.
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Paragraph ten (l0) of the parties' stipulated findings of fact provided as follows:
Wadsworth submitted six (6) Golden Lien Releases to BRN.
The six (6) Golden Lien Releases shall be admitted as Plaintiffs
Trial Exhibit Nos. 29-34. Wadsworth received full consideration
for each of the six (6) Golden Lien Releases that Wadsworth
submitted to BRN. More specifically, for each of the six (6)
Golden Lien Releases that Wadsworth submitted to BRN,
BRN paid to Wadsworth the dollar sum that is referenced in
each of the six (6) Golden Lien Releases. The date of the last
Golden Lien Release is March 19, 2008. The last Golden Lien
Release shall be admitted as Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 34. R.
Vol. 12, p. 3009. (Emphasis Added).
Wadsworth contends that what it stipulated to was that for each of those BRN prepared
lien releases, BRN paid to Wadsworth the dollar sum that is referenced in each. Wadsworth was
only acknowledging that it had received the amount of the payment set forth in the release and
that it was waiving any right to file a lien based upon the amount of that payment. Wadsworth
was not acknowledging that it had received any consideration for subordinating its lien priority
or waiving its right to lien for unpaid retainage.
If the contract between BRN and Wadsworth had specifically required Wadsworth to use
the BRN prepared lien release form, the District Court would have been correct in finding that
the contract provided consideration for the use of the lien release form. However, as set forth
above, Wadsworth contends that the contract did not obligate Wadsworth to use the BRN
prepared lien release form, but only required Wadsworth to utilize a form satisfactory to BRN.
As stated above, BRN made full payment of eleven Wadsworth payment applications
accompanied by a Wadsworth prepared lien release form, and a partial payment on a twelfth
application accompanied by that form. It was obvious to the District Court that BRN accepted
the use of the Wadsworth prepared lien release form.
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There is no argument that Wadsworth ever received anything in addition to the amount of
its payment application. Under the contract, Wadsworth was to be paid ninety-five percent ofits
progress payment applications with five percent being held by BRN as retainage, payable upon
completion of the project. The amount of unpaid retainage that had accrued up to the effective
date of the last BRN prepared lien release form executed by Wadsworth was $257,043.00. R.
Vol. 12 p. 3009. There is simply no consideration for Wadsworth to waive its right to lien for
retainage in the event that it was not paid.
The District Court found that not only had Wadsworth waived its right to lien for the
$247,043.00 in retainage owing as of March 19, 2008, being the date of the last executed BRN
prepared lien release form, that Wadsworth further should be deemed to have waived the right to
lien for an additional $86,942.00, for a total of $343,985.00, on the basis that Wadsworth's
payment application number twenty, covering Wadsworth's work up through July 31, 2008,
while accompanied by a Wadsworth lien release form, should have been accompanied .by a BRN
prepared lien release form which, under the District Court's analysis, would have waived the
additional $86,942.00.
On the basis of the foregoing, Wadsworth respectfully submits that the District Court
committed error in these rulings.·
B.

Waiver.

American Bank argues that by mistakenly executing six BRN prepared lien release
forms, Wadsworth has waived the right to lien for unpaid retainage. A waiver is a voluntary,
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Frontier Federal Savings Loan Association v.
Douglas, 123 Idaho 808, at 812,853 P.2d 553 (1993). As stated by the Court in Seaport Citizens
Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, at 739, 735 P.2d 1047 (Ct. App. 1987), "Waiver is foremost a

question of intent. To establish a waiver, the intent to waive must clearly appear." In Straub v.
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Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 (2007) the issue before this Court was whether a party
voluntarily gave up their right to seek an award of attorney's fees and costs by agreeing to a
stipulation for dismissal. This Court found that there was no waiver and stated:
N either the motion to dismiss nor the stipulation mentions costs or fees.
Since in this case the Smiths were unaware that stipulating to dismissal of
the case also meant that they were agreeing not to pursue costs or fees,
there was no voluntary intentional relinquishment of a known right. At
145 Idaho 69.
In C S & W Contractors, Inc. v. Southwest Savings & Loan Association, 175 Ariz. 55,
852 P.2d 1239 (1992), partially vacated on other grounds at 180 Ariz. 167, 883 P.2d 404 (1994)
the question before the Court was whether certain lien waivers were full and final lien releases,
or only partial releases as to the extent of the payment received. The Court found that the
waivers were partial waivers limited to the amount of payment and stated:
In addition, over Southwest's objection, CS & W's president testified that
his intent in signing the forms was "[t]o generate a partial waiver of lien
for the amount of payment," that he had no discussion with Sencorp that
the waivers were to be construed as full and final lien releases, and that the
custom and practice in the industry was to sign partial waivers of liens
when periodic payments were made.
Southwest contends that the court improperly permitted CS & W to
introduce evidence of the parties' intent in executing the forms. We
disagree. In Collins v. Collins, 46 Ariz. 485,499, 52 P.2d 1169, 1174
(1935), our supreme court noted that "it is almost universally held that as
between a third party and one of the parties to the contract it may always
be proven by parol evidence that a contract between them is different from
what it purports to be on its face." At 852 P.2nd 1243. (Some citations
deleted).
No Wadsworth payment application was initially accompanied by a BRN lien release
form. The only times that the BRN form were used was when BRN proposed to pay an amount
lesser than the Wadsworth payment application and the Wadsworth prepared lien release form
setting forth the amount of the application, or when Wadsworth neglected to submit its form with
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the application, or on the one occasion when the Wadsworth fonn misidentified the name of the
project. In those circumstances, BRN would then prepare its fonn and transmit it by facsimile to
Wadsworth. Stephen Harrell, the President of Wadsworth, would then either sign the BRN
prepared lien release fonn or authorize other Wadsworth employees to execute the fonn, and
transmit it back to BRN. In one of the more significant ironies of this case, at no time did Mr.
Harrell understand that the BRN prepare lien release fonn may have a legal effect different then
the Wadsworth prepared fonn. Kyle Capps, the project manager for BRN, testified that he did
not understand the legal meaning of the BRN prepared fonn, in that it was prepared by the
BRN's attorneys, but he understood that to authorize a progress payment to Wadsworth he
needed some lien release fonn that matched the dollar amount of the actual amount of the
payment. Tr. p. 344, 353, 339. From this it is clear that Wadsworth never voluntarily and
intentionally waived its rights to lien for unpaid retainage.
The District Court found that Mr. Harrell's testimony about his understanding of the
meaning or legal affect of the BRN lien release fonn was irrelevant as to the meaning of the
BRN lien release fonn. R. Vol. 13 p. 3239. That, however, is not the purpose of the testimony.
The purpose of the testimony is to establish that while the BRN lien release fonn may, on its
face, be construed to mean X, at all times Mr. Harrell believed that the fonn meant Y, and that
Mr. Harrell believed that the BRN lien release fonn meant something different than what may be
purported on its face. This testimony does not contradict the words of the BRN lien release fonn
but rather establishes that through its mistaken execution by Wadsworth, Wadsworth never
voluntarily intentionally relinquished its right to lien for unpaid retainage.
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2. Attorney Fees.
The District Court awarded Wadsworth 79.2% of the amount that it sought in this action
and on that basis awarded Wadsworth 79.2% of its claimed attorney fees and costs. In the event
that this Court were to award Wadsworth an amount in excess of the amount awarded by the
District Court by reason of its cross appeal, Wadsworth respectfully submits that the award of
attorney's fees at the District Court should be proportionately increased. American Bank does
not appear to challenge this proposition.
In addition, Wadsworth seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code § 45-513, § 45-522, LR.C.P. 54(c)1, and LA.R. 41. American Bank does not appear
to contest these propositions but instead argues that the issues of attorney's fees both at the trial
court level and on appeal should be based upon this Court's determination of the underlying
issues.

III.

CONCLUSION

Wadsworth has previously submitted that the District Court's rulings in its favor should
be affirmed on appeal. Furthermore, Wadsworth submits that the District Court did commit error
in finding that Wadsworth waived its right to lien for unpaid retainage in the amount of
$257,043.00 to the last effective date of a BRN lien release form, together with an additional
$86,942.00 to the last Wadsworth payment application. As attorney's fees, costs, and interest
were awarded to Wadsworth by the District Court on the percentage basis of Wadsworth's
recovery as compared to the amount of its claim, those awards should likewise be adjusted on a
proportionate basis in the event that this Court awards to Wadsworth the right to recover its
earned retainage. Lastly, Wadsworth respectively submits that it is entitled to an award of its
attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
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RESPECTIVLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of October, 2012.

The Spokesman Review Building
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814-2146
Attorneys for Wadsworth Golf Construction
Company of the Southwest
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 30th day of October, 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT -CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be served
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

~

C. Clayton Gill
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock
& Fields
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
Boise,ID 83701

o
o

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
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